The quantum theoretical concepts of modular momentum and dynamical non-locality, which were introduced four decades ago, have recently been used to explain single particle quantum interference phenomena. Although the non-local exchange of modular momentum associated with such phenomena cannot be directly observed, it has been suggested that effects induced by this exchange can be measured experimentally using weak measurements of pre- and post-selected ensembles of particles. This paper reports on such an optical experiment that yielded measured weak values that were (...) consistent with the theoretical prediction of an effect induced by a non-local exchange of modular momentum. (shrink)

Do chief financial officers (CFOs) of publicly held corporations agree with the Institute of Management Accountants' (IMA) Standards of Ethical Conduct and are they willing to adopt them? To address these issues, a survey was conducted concerning the Standards. The IMA issued the Pronouncement of Standards in June, 1982.In November, 1992, 790 survey questionnaires were mailed to chief financial officers (CFOs) of corporations listed in Forbes. These CFOs held the positions of vice president of finance and controller. Completed questionnaires were (...) received from 208 CFOs representing a 26.3% response rate. The questionnaire employed a 5-point Likert scale and included seven demographic questions to facilitate the interpretation of the findings. (shrink)

Koonin argues that CRISPR-Cas systems present the best-known case in point for Lamarckian evolution because they satisfy his proposed criteria for the specific inheritance of acquired adaptive characteristics. We see two interrelated issues with Koonin’s characterization of CRISPR-Cas systems as Lamarckian. First, at times he appears to confuse an account of the CRISPR-Cas system with an account of the mechanism it employs. We argue there is no evidence for the CRISPR-Cas system being “Lamarckian” in any sense. Second, it is unclear (...) whether the mechanism is more “Lamarckian” than many other forms of genetic change already well-characterized in Darwinian terms. We present three conceptually distinct senses in which the mechanism of IAC may be considered Lamarckian and argue that only the strongest sense of goal-directed IAC would be difficult to accommodate in a Darwinian account. As the CRISPR-Cas mechanism does not qualify as “Lamarckian” in this strong sense, we argue there is no conceptual value in calling it “Lamarckian”. Finally, we suggest that CRISPR-Cas systems do hold the potential for genuinely non-Darwinian, directed evolution in a way that Koonin did not discuss, involving their potential use as a human gene-editing tool. (shrink)

The intent of ethics is to establish a set of standards that will provide a framework to modify, regulate, and possibly enhance moral behaviour. Eleven focus groups were conducted with physicians from six culturally distinct countries to explore their perception of formalized, written ethical guidelines (i.e., codes of ethics, credos, value and mission statements) that attempt to direct their ethical practice. Six themes emerged from the data: lack of awareness, no impact, marginal impact, other codes or value statements supersede, personal (...) codes or values dictate, and ethical guidelines are useful. Overall, codes were valued only when they were congruent with existing personal morality. The findings suggest the need to re-evaluate the purpose, content, and delivery of codes for them to improve their function in promoting ethical conduct. (shrink)

There is a popular hypothesis that performance on implicit and explicit memory tasks reflects 2 distinct memory systems. Explicit memory is said to store those experiences that can be consciously recollected, and implicit memory is said to store experiences and affect subsequent behavior but to be unavailable to conscious awareness. Although this division based on awareness is a useful taxonomy for memory tasks, the authors review the evidence that the unconscious character of implicit memory does not necessitate that it be (...) treated as a separate system of human memory. They also argue that some implicit and explicit memory tasks share the same memory representations and that the important distinction is whether the task (implicit or explicit) requires the formation of a new association. The authors review and critique dissociations from the behavioral, amnesia, and neuroimaging literatures that have been advanced in support of separate explicit and implicit memory systems by highlighting contradictory evidence and by illustrating how the data can be accounted for using a simple computational memory model that assumes the same memory representation for those disparate tasks. (shrink)

Unfounded—conspiracy and health—beliefs about COVID-19 have accompanied the pandemic worldwide. Here, we examined cross-nationally the structure and correlates of these beliefs with an 8-item scale, using a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. We obtained a two-factor model of unfounded (conspiracy and health) beliefs with good internal structure (average CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.04), but a high correlation between the two factors (average latent factor correlation = 0.57). This model was replicable across 50 countries (total N = 13,579), (...) as evidenced by metric invariance between countries (CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMS = 0.07) as well as scalar invariance across genders (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03) and educational levels (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03). Also, lower levels of education, more fear of COVID-19, and more cynicism were weakly associated with stronger conspiracy and health beliefs. The study contributes to knowledge about the structure of unfounded beliefs, and reveals the potential relevance of affective (i.e., fear of COVID-19) and cognitive (i.e., cynicism) factors along with demographics, in endorsing such beliefs. In summary, we obtained cross-cultural evidence for the distinctiveness of unfounded conspiracy and health beliefs about COVID-19 in terms of their structure and correlates. (shrink)

In the second edition of this groundbreaking text in non-Western philosophy, sixteen experts introduce some of the great philosophical traditions in the world. The essays unveil exciting, sophisticated philosophical traditions that are too often neglected in the western world. The contributors include the leading scholars in their fields, but they write for students coming to these concepts for the first time. Building on revisions and updates to the original, this new edition also considers three philosophical traditions for the first time—Jewish, (...) Buddhist, and South Pacific philosophy. (shrink)

This study uses data from Google Trends and Twitter to analyze how public interest and sentiment towards Universal Basic Income (UBI) changed across all 50 states and Washington D.C. between 2018 and 2021. We specifically selected this time period as it includes both Andrew Yang’s UBI campaign during the Democratic primaries in 2019 and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 when UBI gained attention due to the federal government’s unconditional cash payment to almost all citizens. To overcome the limitations of sporadic (...) opinion polls, we built on a recent development of the rescaling method to generate longitudinal Google Trends and conducted Twitter sentiment analysis. We observed a modest rise in public interest in UBI during Andrew Yang’s campaign, especially in blue states, and a significant increase across all states at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although it quickly waned, the level of public attention became elevated compared to the pre-pandemic level. Contrary to previous studies, our analysis also reveals that overall sentiment became less positive after the peak interest during the pandemic, as more people engaged in online discussions. (shrink)

It is interesting to see Aristotle's observation of natural law in order to renew the ideal of law against the Marxist theory of society, to renounce the normative theory of the nation, and to study the liberal theory of information. All this allows us to expect the realization of social justice and human rights from the institutionalization of markets and the precondition of the boundary of the general culture, namely the communitarian ethics and the moral reformation against the genealogist tradition. (...) We find in the tradition inaugurated by Aristotle the function of ethical discussion about the common good, thus imbricating the differences stratified by the economic evolution in the polis. (shrink)

This is a proceedings based on the talk that was made in the workshop “Black Holes, Gravitational Waves and Spacetime Singularities” at Vatican Observatory on 9–12 May 2017. Since then we have constructed some corrections, hence this paper includes them. Here we employ the \\)D Kitaev superconductor model and perform the Wilsonian renormalization group transformation in a real space. We regard the running energy scale or the repetition number of RG transformation as a new emergent direction of the spacetime, thus (...) constructing a one dimensional higher spacetime. The solution for the beta function is plugged into the effective action and then the RG information is encoded in the curvature of the emergent spacetime. We found that there are two fixed points in which one corresponds to the Lifshitz spacetime with the dynamical critical exponent \ and the other fixed point corresponds to the AdS\ spacetime. The topological superconducting phase induces a naked singularity in the spacetime and the trivial superconducting phase produces regular spacetime. Except the fixed points, each parameter phase shows spatial anisotropic spacetime description as it goes to IR limit. (shrink)

Cet article propose une reconstruction du débat wolffien sur l'idéalisme de Leibniz autour de la première réception de la Monadologie de Leibniz. Cette reconstruction impose une relecture de quelques problèmes centraux à ce débat: traduction infidèle d'un terme dans la Monadologie latine ( « le composé » est traduit par « substantia composita »); statut du corps en tant que substance composée; statut des éléments en tant que substances simples dont résultent les corps (et cela contre la conception cartésienne de (...) la substance); statut des notions leibniziennes de perception, force et harmonie préétablie; statut de l'expérience comme procédé ho liste et systématique (contre sa conception et la tabula rasa chez Locke) dans la réception et le système wolffiens. Un examen approfondi des textes fondateurs de cette réception (Bilfinger et Wolff) nous permet de reconsidérer sous un nouvel angle le rapport entre Leibniz et Wolff. (shrink)

1. What is Korean Philosophy? 2. What is Philosophy? : Philosophy as Axial Ideas, and Philosophy as Modern ideas 3. What are the distinctions of Korean Philosophy? 1. What is Korean Philosophy? What is Philosophy? It represents human, universal ideas. Does there exist Korean Philosophy that could represent the prevalent and universal ideas among Koreans, within the Korean regions? There are two popular meanings of Philosophy: a narrow meaning and a broad one. Korean Philosophy does not exist as philosophy within (...) the narrow meaning. Philosophy (philosophy = philia+sophia) means “love (philia) of wisdom (sophia)” in the narrow sense that appeared as a demotic term in ancient Greece, and it became a technical term afterward. In the broad sense of philosophy,there are Arabic, Indian, and Chinese Philosophy. They mainly declare their existence through their respective philosophical histories. What is Korean Philosophy? In the narrow definition of ancient Greece, Korean Philosophy first appeared in the Modern Age (1860 A.D.). But In the broad definition of Arabia, India, and China, Korean Philosophy first appeared in “Age of Three Kingdoms of Korea” (37 B.C. ~688 A.D.). Is there a distinct, Korean Philosophy? Korean Philosophy can be defined in two ways: by the philosophy of the Axial Idea and by the philosophy of modern ideas. There are three periods in the history of Korean Philosophy: Korean original, traditional, and modern philosophy. Is there a distinct, Korean Philosophy? The distinctions of the Philosophy native to Korea are based on: 1) contents of “Josunchendook” (Sanhaegyung) 2) terms of “Gojosun,” (Samgukyusa) 3) “Punglu” (Samguksagi) 4) “Chenbugyung” (Handangogi). In these texts are these concepts: 1) the ideas of human respect in “Josunchendook”, 2) the philosophy of the mutual, respectful relations in “Gojosun”, 3) the synthesis ideas from three doctrines - Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism-in “Pungludo”, and 4) an integration of these three concepts (1 to 3) in“Chenbugyung”; their characteristic is state philosophy, and is seen as modern inter-subjectivity. The distinction of Korean traditional philosophy is one that contains thorough, synthetic ideas (e.g., Wonhyo's idea of one Buddhism that contains all Buddhist sects, Euichon's Chentaejong, Jinul's Jogaejong and so on). These ideas have achieved international renown due to their thoroughness and precision. All types of Korean, traditional philosophy have the trait of thoroughness, whether they stem from primarily Buddhist and Confucian thought. Korean modern philosophy includes the philosophical products (or thoughts) of seven Korean national societies of philosophy. Korean modern philosophy must study modern Korea society. It is changing the Candle spiritual Revolution.This Revolution claims not modern Rights of freedom, equality, and benevolence, but Rights to live all lives altogether. It is happening in the background of two fears: a fear of crazy ox and a fear of distrust society system. The Subject of candle Revolution is mass in the streets, networks, and homes. They have both sunin and democratic citizen minds. While candles fire in the streets, internets, and homes, Candle Revolution is continuing forever in Korean mind. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Oranges from SpainDavid Park (bio)It's not a fruit shop any more. Afterwards, his wife sold it and someone opened up a fast food business. You wouldn’t recognize it now—it's all flashing neon, girls in identical uniforms and the type of food that has no taste. Even Gerry Breen wouldn’t recognize it. Either consciously or unconsciously, I don’t seem to pass that way very often, but when I do I (...) always stop and look at it. The neon brightness burns the senses and sears the memories like a wound being cauterized; but then it all comes back and out flows a flood of memory that nothing can stem.I was sixteen years old and very young when I went to work for Mr Breen in his fruit shop. It was that summer when it seemed to rain every day and a good day stood out like something special. I got the job through patronage. My father and Gerry Breen went back a long way—that always struck me as strange, because they were so unalike as men. Apparently, they were both born in the same street and grew up together, and even when my father's career as a solicitor took him up-market, they still got together occasionally. My father collected an order of fruit every Friday night on his way home from work, and as children we always talked about ‘Gerry Breen's apples’. It's funny the things you [End Page 249] remember, and I can recall very clearly my mother and father having an argument about it one day. She wanted to start getting fruit from the supermarket for some reason, but my father wouldn’t hear of it. He got quite agitated about it and almost ended up shouting, which was very unlike him. Maybe he acted out of loyalty, or maybe he owed him some kind of favour, but whatever the reason, the arrangement continued.If his name is mentioned now they never do it in front of me. It's almost as if he never existed. At first it angered me—it was almost as if they thought I would disintegrate at its sound—but gradually I came to be grateful for it. I didn’t even go to the funeral, and from that moment it was obvious my family sought to draw a curtain over the whole event. My mother had taken me away for a week's holiday. We stayed with one of her sisters who lives in Donegal, and I’ve never had a more miserable time. Inevitably, it rained every day and there was nothing to do but mope around and remember, trapped in a house full of women, where the only sounds were the clink of china cups and the click of knitting needles. It was then the dreams started. The intervening years have lessened their frequency but not their horror. When I woke up screaming for about the tenth time, they took me to a special doctor who reassured them with all the usual platitudes—I’d grow out of it, time was a great healer, and so on. In one sense I did grow out of it—I stopped telling anyone about the nightmares and kept them strictly private. They don’t come very often now, but when they do only my wife knows. Sometimes she cradles me in her arms like a child until I fall asleep again.I hadn’t even really wanted a job in the first place. It was all my father's idea. He remembered the long weeks of boredom I had complained about the summer before and probably the nuisance I had been as I lazed about the house. I walked right into his trap. He knew I’d been working up to ask if I could have a motorbike for my next birthday. The signs weren’t good, and my mother's instinctive caution would have been as difficult a barrier to surmount as the expense, so it came as a surprise when my father casually enquired if I’d be interested in starting to save for one. I took the bait... (shrink)

In this paper I introduce John D. Caputo’s view of the divine and argue against his claim that we can preserve faith in God while dropping the idea of divine revelation. Despite Caputo’s apophatic point of view, he makes two claims with regard to God, or ’the divine’. First, he claims that we all have a divine call for justice and compassion in us. Secondly, he claims that God’s kingdom comes true if we make it happen and that this is (...) something we can hope for. In the first half of this paper I will argue that Caputo does not have to reject the idea of revelation if we understand revelation as involving an interpretation of the experiences with the divine. In the second half, I will claim that Caputo even has to allow for divine revelation if he wants to stick to his positive statements about God. We can only know that a desire is divine if we have criteria to distinguish the divine from the profane or the diabolic. Based on Richard Kearney and John Hick I argue that particular traditions offer such criteria and that they ultimately depend on what is taken to be God’s will. Likewise, to hope that the kingdom of God comes and to act in a way that realizes it presupposes that the agent believes this to be the way God wants him to live—and God’s will must have somehow been disclosed. (shrink)

"Comme le Sabbat, l'Etat a été fait pour l'homme et non l'homme pour l'Etat " Cette affirmation préface les arguments en faveur d'un Etat moderne constitué selon les principes de John Locke et aide à identifier les valeurs essentielles à une société pluraliste. L'ouvrage traite des droits du citoyen, de la tolérance comme droit fondamental, et de la distinction entre nation et Etat. L'auteur applique ces diverses notions aux revendications traditionnelles des Premières Nations, des Inuits et des Bandes indiennes d'Amérique (...) du Nord. (shrink)

While Statius' decision to treat events in landlocked Thebes offered limited opportunity to integrate into his poem a maritime episode, which had become a staple epic ingredient by the first centurya.d.,theThebaidis dotted with references to the Argonauts' quest for the Golden Fleece, including a narrative flashback of the crew's time at Lemnos. Following in a long tradition of cross-contamination between Argonautic and Theban literary texts, Statius' poem also evokes works of literature which narrate the legend, notably theArgonauticasof Apollonius Rhodius and (...) Valerius Flaccus. A lack of scholarly focus on this latter area has generally led to a piecemeal scrutiny of individual allusive passages rather than a systematic treatment. However, Stover's recent paper paves the way for a more productive approach through its contention that theThebaidmakes widespread use of the mythic subject matter: ‘It … appears that Statius frequently appropriates the Argonautic tradition and that he does so largely to present the Argives as quasi Argonauts. This suggests that their adventure to conquer Thebes is analogous to the Argonauts’ voyage to Colchis.'. (shrink)

Kichul Kim, né en 1969 à Séoul, a ceci de remarquable qu’il prétend — et réussit — à sculpter le son. En effet, il a une formation de sculpteur. Mais il se fascine très tôt pour le son, pour des raisons spirituelles. L’énigme du bodhisattva Gwan-eum qui, selon l’étymologie de son nom, « voit ou fait voir les sons », l’intrigue. Une intuition lui révèle — pense-t-il — de quoi il s’agit. Il va s’efforcer de le faire voir à son (...) tour. Le son fait voir, visualiser, évoquer, et on peut donc, en ce sens, voir le son. Ses installations sonores sont en général réalisées dans des formes minimales et simplifiées. Ces formes pures ne correspondent qu’au son qu’il veut diffuser. C’est le son qu’émettent des haut-parleurs, un son qu’il a enregistré et qui parle. En effet, le son, tout invisible et intangible qu’il est, par l’espace qu’il recrée et modèle, est tridimensionnel, et sculptable. Le spectateur ne peut certes pas voir ce travail sonore par ses yeux de chair, pas plus qu’il ne peut le toucher de sa main, mais son œil de l’imagination, son imagination visuelle, le construit, et en ce sens il le perçoit bien : à partir du son se crée une image, une image dont l’intensité frôle l’illusion. On a là un véritable environnement créé par le son. Inspiré par l’Extrême-Orient ancien, son art et sa pensée, Kichul Kim puise dans ses sites historiques, religieux souvent, et dans la nature, son inspiration et ses enregistrements. L’environnement particulier d’origine est rendu présent par son son, si puissamment que l’auditeur devient spectateur, recréant activement la scène originelle : spect-acteur. Plongé si profondément en lui-même, il est graduellement conduit aux portes d’une sorte de méditation, ici et ailleurs à la fois, comme hors du temps. Kichul Kim, born in 1969 in Seoul, is remarkable in that he claims—and succeeds—to carve the sound. He trained as a sculptor but was fascinated very early with the sound, for spiritual reasons. The enigma of the Bodhisattva Gwan-eum which, according to the etymology of its name, “sees or makes one see sounds”, intrigued him. He understood intuititvely what it means and tried to examplify it himself. The sound makes you see, visualize, evoke, and you can, in this sense, see the sound. His sound installations are generally performed in minimal and simplified forms. These pure forms correspond only to the sound he wants to produce. This is the sound emitted through loudspeakers, a sound that he recorded and that speaks. Indeed, the sound, as invisible and intangible as it is, thanks to the space it recreates and models, becomes three-dimensional, and “sculptable”. The spectator certainly cannot see this sonic work through his/her eyes of flesh, any more than he/she can touch it with his/her hand. But his/her eye of the imagination, the visual imagination, builds it, and in this sense he/she perceives it well: from the sound is created an image whose intensity borders on illusion. This is a real environment created by sound. Inspired by the ancient Far East, its art and thought, Kichul Kim draws from historical sites, often religious, and from nature, for his inspiration, and recordings. The particular environment of which the sounds originates is made present by the sound, so powerfully that the listener becomes a spectator, actively recreating the original scene: spect-actor. So deeply immersed in himself, he is gradually led to the gates of a kind of meditation, here and elsewhere at once, as if out of time. (shrink)

ObjectiveWe argue that people often fail to perceive and process stimuli easily available to them. In other words, we challenge the tacit assumption that awareness is unbounded and provide evidence that humans regularly fail to see and use stimuli and information easily available to them. We call this phenomenon “bounded awareness” (Bazerman and Chugh in Frontiers of social psychology: negotiations, Psychology Press: College Park 2005). Findings We begin by first describing perceptual mental processes in which obvious information is missed—that is, (...) simply not seen—by the visual perceiver. Inattentional blindness and change blindness are examples. We then extend this phenomenon to decision making and forecasting, using evidence about focalism to illustrate how people over focus on some information and fail to use other easily available information. We next examine how these processes of bounded awareness may extend to other important domains and across levels of analysis, such as information-sharing in groups, decision making in negotiators, and in competitive bidding situations such as auctions.ConclusionsBounded awareness is a phenomenon that encompasses a variety of psychological processes, all of which lead to the same error: a failure to see, seek, use, or share important and relevant information that is easily seen, sought, used, or shared. (shrink)

The American tort system regularly conducts a sort of lottery in which plaintiffs try to name as many defendants in a tort action as they can in order to collect a large judgment from at least one of them. This procedure is encouraged under strict joint and several liability, which permits plaintiffs to recover greater damages from defendants - usually businesses - with less moral culpability for the tort than poorer defendants, who bear greater culpability. In a case involving the (...) Disney Corporation and a negligent amusement park rider, for instance, Disney was forced to pay 86% of the court award to the plaintiff, even though the jury found the company to be only 1% liable for the injury. The legal principle of joint and several liability violates morality in several different ways. Even though the principle appears to be better in the short run for plaintiffs, I will show that it fails not only to satisfy utilitarianism, but compensatory justice as well. Hence, the legal principle of joint and several liability should be eliminated in favor of a better, fairer law, which I will briefly sketch at the end. (shrink)

The Problem of Perception offers two arguments against direct realism--one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination--that no current theory of ...

Smart communities have recently gained much attention. Researchers have been trying to tackle a number of challenges faced by smart communities. Interoperability is one key challenge that occurs due to different systems using different knowledge representations. To solve interoperability problems, ontologies are seen as a promising solution as they provide a commonly agreed vocabulary for representing data that are understandable by stakeholders of smart communities. Smart communities make use of Internet of Things (IoT) and ubiquitous networks to support communication among (...) objects and devices in such environments. Smart campuses are examples of smart communities. Recently, many articles related to ontologies focusing on smart communities and smart campuses in IoT environments, have been published. This paper presents a Systematic Literature Review that has been conducted using Google Scholar. 18 ontologies for smart communities/smart campuses have been identified and analyzed out of 341 articles from year 2010 to 2019. The review classifies the ontologies in terms of domain, ontologies being reused, availability online, limitations, language adopted and coverage. It additionally discusses on the standards, the level of expressiveness, the ontology development approaches and methodologies adopted by the identified ontologies. Our analysis shows that the identified ontologies have been developed based on different ontological commitments. None of them have come up with a core semantic model that models different collaborating domains in a smart campus such as smart learning, smart management, smart governance, smart room, smart health, smart library and smart parking among others and that enhances cross-domain interoperability in a such an environment. Further details on our findings are presented and discussed in the paper. (shrink)

“Ancient DNA Research” is the practice of extracting, sequencing, and analyzing degraded DNA from dead organisms that are hundreds to thousands of years old. Today, many researchers are interested in adapting state-of-the-art molecular biological techniques and high-throughput sequencing technologies to optimize the recovery of DNA from fossils, then use it for studying evolutionary history. However, the recovery of DNA from fossils has also fueled the idea of resurrecting extinct species, especially as its emergence corresponded with the book and movie Jurassic (...) Park in the 1990s. In this paper, I use historical material, interviews with scientists, and philosophical literature to argue that the search for DNA from fossils can be characterized as a data-driven and celebrity-driven practice. Philosophers have recently argued the need to seriously consider the role of data-driven inquiry in the sciences, and likewise, this history highlights the need to seriously consider the role of celebrity in shaping the kind of research that gets pursued, funded, and ultimately completed. On this point, this history highlights that the traditional philosophical and scientific distinctions between data-driven and hypothesis-driven research are not always useful for understanding the process and practice of science. Consequently, I argue that the celebrity status of a particular research practice can be considered as a “serious epistemic strategy” that researchers, as well as editors and funders, employ when making choices about their research and publication processes. This interplay between celebrity and methodology matters for the epistemology of science. (shrink)

THE PROBLEM: MOTORCAR MORALITY AND AUTOMOBILE AGEINGAdvances in modern technology mean that cars are living longer than ever before. This raises important end-of-road-life issues, as it becomes increasingly difficult to provide leaded fuel and shelter for our hydraulically challenged, ageing automobile population. The garage is full, and off-street parking is beyond the financial scope of most low and middle income families. It is a case of rust or bust.NATURAL LAW THEORY, TRAFFIC, AND THE TRUTHSociety has long been reluctant to countenance (...) the concept of actively ending the road-life of motor vehicles, preferring to allow Nature to take its course. Simpler to let the natural phenomena of corrosion and inbuilt obsolescence take their inevitable toll, until the head gasket blows and the piston rods seize up for the last time.But can we afford to allow elderly cars to simply choke and splutter as our roads become increasingly over populated and our atmosphere ever more polluted? Old bangers demand our attention, as their paint peels, their balding tyres leave their tread at every T-junction, their suspension sags, and their chrome corrodes. Is there an alternative to the ailing alternator and the carbonised carburettor?EQUAL ROAD RIGHTSPrinciples of distributive …. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXIII, Number 2, November 1997, pp. 315-335 Reid: Conception, Representation and Innate Ideas ROGER D. GALLIE Section I of this paper begins with a presentation of Thomas Reid's doctrine of the signification of words, of what words signify or represent. That presentation serves to introduce a problem of interpretation, namely, what Reid thinks the connection is between conceiving something and grasping what a term for it (...) signifies. It is pointed out that even if Reid maintains that what a word signifies is conceived by both speaker and hearer when that word is understood, this is a far cry from the position that he takes the stronger view, whether for all or only for some things, that their being conceived involves the understanding of a term or terms. The position that he does indeed take this stronger, although moderate, view is defended in sections II, III and IV. In sections II and III it is argued that, in Reid's view, for an adequate conception of an individual, real or imaginary, a conception of its attributes is needed. In section IV it is argued that the possession of general conceptions (in distinction from their formation), without which conception of attributes is impossible, requires appropriate understanding of general terms. So since for the conception of an individual a conception of its attributes is needed, and since for the conception of attributes appropriate understanding of general terms is required, we arrive at a textually well-founded position: for the conception of most things, in Reid's view, understanding of terms is indispensable. Roger D. Gallie is at the Department of Philosophy, Nottingham University, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD UK. email: [email protected] 316 Roger D. Gallie The remainder of the paper considers the following question: to what extent, if any, Reid is committed to acceptance of nativist views on concept possession? To answer, in section V we consider to what extent Reid's moderate position on the possession of conceptions commits him to accepting Jerry Fodor's representational theory of mind (RTM) for propositional attitudes. It is clear that the view that a propositional attitude state such as belief involves some relation between a person and a representation such as a significant word, phrase or sentence of a natural language such as English can fairly be attributed to Reid. But it is also clear that Reid cannot be an adherent of the view that persons have a functional cum computational relation to Fodorean mental representations, so he cannot be an adherent of any nativism ex- plicitly contained in such a view. But it is to be noted that in his Inquiry, Chapter IV, Reid argues by a different route that in order to acquire a language such as English prior mastery of a system of significant signs is required. In section VI Keith Lehrer's argument in criticism of a reductionist interpretation of a position such as Fodor's is presented: that for a sign to signify something to someone presupposes that that person has a conception of what is signified. It is however pointed out that since there is a case for not viewing Fodor's position as reductionist overall Fodor can accept Lehrer's argument. Lehrer's innatist position, which he both claims to follow easily from this critical argument and to be a correct interpretation of Reid, is then presented: that we must presuppose an innate understanding of some signs to account for our learning the meaning of any signs. The objection that Reid too must accept the alleged innatist implications of Lehrer's critical argument in view of the implications of his moderate position on the possession of conceptions is considered and rebutted. In section VIII argue that while Lehrer makes a respectable case for innate principles of formation of conceptions such as that of hardness, something that Reid clearly endorses in his Inquiry, Chapter V, he does not succeed in making a case for there being any innate possession of conceptions. Finally, in section VIII, Reid's mature views in the Intellectual Powers, Essay VI, on how conceptions come to be possessed are expounded, and are fleshed out with some... (shrink)

This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.

An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent.There are two main issues to address. The first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this (...) still assigns an essential role to belief in perception, though the belief may be of an attenuated form. The second is Fred Dretske’s claim that even attenuated belief may be entirely absent from perception. It is argued that ‘non-epistemic’ perception can be understood only by employing the concept of ‘epistemic’ perception; that the former can occur only partially---i.e., within perceptions that are otherwise epistemic; and that by switching attention from the perception of objects to the Phenomenological tradition’s concern with the perception of world, we can see that perception must be entirely permeated with ‘doxastic’ force. (shrink)

An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingentThere are two main issues to address. the first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this (...) still assigns an essential role to belief in perception, though the belief may be of an attenuated form. the second is Fred Dretske's claim that even attenuated belief may be entirely absent from perception. It is argued that (a) ‘non‐epistemic’perception can be understood only by employing the concept of ‘epistemic’perception; (b) that the former can occur only partially—i.e., within perceptions that are otherwise epistemic; and (c) that by switching attention from the perception of objects to the Phenomenological tradition's concern with the perception of world, we can see that perception must be entirely permeated with ‘doxastic’force. (shrink)

This paper, which has both a historical and a polemical aspect, investigates the view, dominant throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that the sense of sight is, originally, not phenomenally three-dimensional in character, and that we must come to interpret its properly two-dimensional data by reference to the sense of 'touch'. The principal argument for this claim, due to Berkeley, is examined and found wanting. The supposedly confirming findings concerning 'Molyneux subjects' are also investigated and are shown to be either (...) irrelevant or disconfirming. Recent investigations on infant and neonatal perception are discussed and are also found to be disconfirming. An innatist version of the theory is then considered and is shown to be undermined by the largely 'Gibsonian' character of early space-perception. Finally three recent arguments in favour of the theory - two from psychologists, one from a philosopher - are considered and answered. (shrink)